Be respectful in your interactions with fellow members. You can Go Here to read our Terms and Rules. Visit My Profile to create your avatar and see your posts. If you to report a bug or issue, email us at support.GI US.com

Title: October 28, 2025

GRAY ZONE BRIEF 28 OCTOBER 2025

TOP 3 ITEMS

U.S. & CHINA TRADE

Trade truce. China and the U.S. agreed over the weekend on a “basic consensus” to address one another’s trade concerns. At a meeting in Malaysia attended by Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, the sides discussed U.S. tariffs on China’s maritime, logistics and shipbuilding sectors, extension of the reciprocal tariff suspension, fentanyl-related tariffs and law enforcement cooperation, agricultural trade and export controls. According to the White House, U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet in South Korea on Oct. 30. Beijing has not confirmed the meeting.

U.S. & MALAYSIA

Rare earths deal. The U.S. and Malaysia signed a critical minerals agreement on Sunday. Kuala Lumpur pledged to refrain from banning or imposing quotas on critical mineral exports to the U.S., and Washington agreed to formalize a 19 percent tariff on Malaysian goods. Malaysia also agreed to accelerate the development of its critical minerals sector in partnership with U.S. companies, including extending operating licenses to increase production capacity.

U.S. & JAPAN

Trump says missiles for Japan’s F-35s will arrive ‘this week’ during visit to USS George Washington. President Trump told US troops in Japan that missiles for Tokyo’s F-35 jets are arriving "this week," marking a new phase in US–Japan defense cooperation amid his ongoing Asia tour. President Donald Trump told U.S. troops aboard the USS George Washington at Japan’s Yokosuka Naval Base on Tuesday that the "first batch of missiles for Japan’s F-35 fighter jets "will arrive this week," suggesting that U.S. defense deliveries to Tokyo are moving ahead of schedule.

The comments came during Trump’s hour-long remarks to sailors as part of his wider Asia trip, which included a stop in Malaysia before Japan, where he met with the country’s first female prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, and signed a new U.S.-Japan framework agreement on rare earth minerals. Later this week, Trump is expected to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Washington has approved several large arms sales to Japan, including advanced AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9X air-to-air missiles designed for F-35s.

The comments came during Trump’s hour-long remarks to sailors as part of his wider Asia trip, which included a stop in Malaysia before Japan, where he met with the country’s first female prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, and signed a new U.S.-Japan framework agreement on rare earth minerals. Later this week, Trump is expected to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Washington has approved several large arms sales to Japan, including advanced AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9X air-to-air missiles designed for F-35s.

Why These Matter:

The U.S. is securing rare earth minerals to counter China’s monopoly on rare earths elements critical to our technology and defense industries, while bolstering security and defense with partners across Asia to gain leverage ahead of Trump’s meeting with Xi Jinping.

This “Declaw & Defang” the Dragon strategy will prove crucial in the attempt to rein China into better trade deals for the U.S. and possibly persuade them not to invade Taiwan and avoid near future conflict in 2026, in the South China Sea.

Any conflict between the U.S. & China would no doubt lead to intensified gray zone conflict where both the U.S. and China could potentially suffer the long-term consequences of multiple grid down scenarios, financial and economic crises, food security and supply chain issues.This would no doubt put a tremendous strain on a global economy that is currently slow growth with a decrease in global financial investment.

MIDDLE EAST SITREP

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Armed Forces’ apparent hesitancy to disarm Hezbollah has increased international frustration and concern about a potential resumption of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. Deputy US Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus arrived in Beirut on October 27 to meet with senior Lebanese officials in hopes of preventing renewed fighting between Israel and Hezbollah.

• Israeli Strikes in Lebanon: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued its airstrike campaign across Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution efforts. The IDF has killed approximately seven Hezbollah fighters and one Hezbollah-affiliated weapons smuggler since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on October 24.

• Iranian Political Faction Infighting: Iranian officials are concerned that divisions among Iranian political factions around foreign policy will destabilize the Iranian regime and present opportunities for exploitation by Iran’s adversaries. Pragmatic hardliner and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf called on all Iranian political factions to demonstrate national unity in a parliament session on October 26.

• Iraqi Shia Political Party Divisions: Unspecified Shia Coordination Framework parties are reportedly attempting to receive political support from the United States ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections, which reflects continued divisions within the coalition. Iraqi media reported on October 27 that unspecified Shia Coordination Framework parties are in a “political rush” to receive US support before the elections on November 11, 2025.

GAZA UPDATE

Technocratic committee. Leaders of Palestinian factions, including Hamas, met in Cairo and agreed to transfer governance of the Gaza Strip to an interim committee made up of Palestinian technocrats. The committee, working with Arab countries and international institutions, will manage basic services in Gaza. A committee will also be established to oversee the financing and implementation of Gaza’s reconstruction.

ISRAEL & GAZA

Securing the peace. Israel’s key remaining objective in Gaza is the complete demilitarization of the strip, according to Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz. Approximately 60 percent of the tunnels in Gaza still exist, Katz said, adding that the Israeli military was working to destroy the remaining tunnels in the Israel-controlled “yellow zone.” Katz also said Israel has stressed to the U.S. the importance of completing the Gaza operation for the implementation of Trump’s peace plan. Meanwhile, the U.S. has reportedly deployed reconnaissance drones over Gaza to monitor both sides’ compliance with the “fragile” ceasefire, U.S. and Israeli officials said.

U.S. FORCES IN SYRIA

Increased activity. A 25-truck convoy of the U.S.-led international coalition was spotted crossing the border into Syria from Iraq’s Kurdistan Region carrying weapons and military equipment, the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights reported. The convoy arrived last Friday at the Qasrak base in the northern province of Hasakah. On Oct. 16, another row of 20 trucks carrying equipment and fuel arrived at the same base. This comes as the coalition has begun construction of a new military outpost near the border crossing between Syria, Iraq and Jordan. In that same area, increased military activity has recently been reported, including reconnaissance drone flights and the deployment of U.S. tanks and aircraft.

PKK & TURKEY

PKK withdrawal. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a separatist group more commonly known as the PKK that the government in Ankara considers a terrorist organization, announced that it would withdraw all its fighters from Turkey in accordance with the peace agreement forged with Ankara. Kurdish news agencies seem to have confirmed as much, releasing footage of PKK fighters leaving the country for northern Iraq.

GLOBAL SITREP

AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN

Taliban ceasefire. After 15 hours of negotiations in Istanbul, representatives of the Taliban submitted the final draft of a ceasefire agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The document emphasizes the principle of “non-violation of Afghan territory and airspace” and the commitment to preventing the use of Pakistani territory by “opponents of the Taliban.” It also provides for the creation of a mechanism to monitor and exchange information on possible violations. Negotiations are expected to continue as Pakistan insists on imposing punitive measures against the Pakistani branch of the Taliban, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, for recent cross-border attacks.

RUSSIA & NORTH KOREA

Russian and North Korean commitments. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui in Moscow. The Kremlin meeting reaffirmed what Putin described as the “planned and stable” development of ties fully aligned with the mutual interests of the two countries.

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DEAL

Russia and Malaysia. Russia is ready to help Malaysia build a large-capacity nuclear power plant, as well as attendant modular reactors, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk said after a meeting with his Malaysian counterpart. During the meeting, they talked up the potential for increased bilateral trade, particularly with regard to energy, agricultural products, pharmaceuticals and industrial equipment. From January to August, trade between the countries grew by 32.1 percent, reaching $2.47 billion.

U.S. & UZBEKISTAN

The U.S. in Uzbekistan. A U.S. delegation led by Sergio Gor, the special envoy for South and Central Asian affairs, and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau is in Uzbekistan for discussions on trade and investment in strategic minerals and energy. The delegation also met with representatives of U.S. companies to discuss prospects for joint projects. It will next visit Kazakhstan to discuss bilateral and regional issues, including strengthening U.S.-Kazakh political dialogue and expanding trade and economic cooperation.

GZB INFOCUS: The State of the Axis of Resistance: Assessing Risks and Opportunities for the United States

• Iran and its so-called Axis of Resistance are at their weakest in years. They have sustained significant defeats since the beginning of 2024, losing much of their military strength and influence across the Middle East.

• Iran and its Axis of Resistance are now trying to slow and reverse their losses. They are also fundamentally rethinking their strategy, which will change the nature of the threat that Iran poses to US interests, personnel, and partners in the Middle East.

• The United States cannot allow Iran to rebuild and again threaten to destabilize the Middle East. That would risk Washington again suffering a strategic surprise and jeopardizing its competition with China and Russia.

• The United States should take proactive measures to solidify the losses that Iran and its Axis of Resistance have incurred and use that momentum to further contain them across the Middle East.

Executive Summary:

Iran has suffered repeated defeats across the Middle East since the beginning of 2024. Israel has severely damaged the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance in its campaigns against Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Assad regime in Syria has fallen and severed Iranian access to its militia allies in the Levant. And Israeli operations have eliminated key Iranian and Iranian-backed figures and degraded Iranian air defenses and missile forces. Tehran has thus become more vulnerable and lost much of its regional influence and ability to project force, bringing it to its weakest in decades.

These defeats have reduced the threat to US interests, personnel, and partners in the Middle East and afforded the United States the strategic bandwidth to focus its attention and resources on other parts of the globe.

There is no guarantee, however, that these victories will last. Iran and its Axis of Resistance remain hostile to the United States and its partners and expect more conflict. They will spend the coming years rebuilding their strength and collaborating with major US adversaries, such as China, North Korea, and Russia, to erode US global influence and undermine the US-led international order. Tehran and its militia allies will, of course, need years of concerted effort and investment to return to their previous levels of strength. But if left unchecked in that time, they will likely succeed, which would enable them to again plunge the Middle East into instability.

The United States cannot accept that risk, as it was under those conditions that Hamas invaded Israel and ignited a war that rapidly spread across the Middle East. Washington faced numerous crises suddenly, as Iranian and Iranian-backed forces attacked American service members, international shipping, and key US partners. Tehran meanwhile accelerated its nuclear activities, at one point having enough fissile material to produce nine nuclear weapons within weeks. These challenges yanked US attention and resources back to the region and away from other global priorities, such as competition with China and Russia. Incurring such a strategic setback in the Middle East at some future point when the United States has already committed itself to managing crises elsewhere in the world, such as a Chinese attack on Taiwan, could be catastrophic.

The United States should therefore capitalize on the moment of relative weakness affecting Iran and its Axis of Resistance to make lasting gains and prevent them from rebuilding. That means solidifying recent progress and using the positive momentum to further constrain Iranian and Iranian-backed forces across the Middle East. Washington has an unprecedented opportunity in this regard. Pressing this advantage could reduce the medium- and long-term threats to US interests, personnel, and partners and help stabilize the region after two years of widespread conflict. It could also help ensure that the United States can safely focus on advancing its interests and defending its principles elsewhere.

***This report provides recommendations that form a foundation from which the United States can develop a more coherent, long-term approach to containing the Iranian threat and promoting Middle Eastern stability.

First, the United States must collaborate with its international partners, especially the European countries, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and rebuilding its offensive capabilities. Negotiations are a perfectly viable way to prevent nuclear proliferation in principle. But the United States must remain prepared to use force—as it has already to tremendous effect—to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. The United States and its international partners must also enforce the UN “snapback” sanctions that the United Kingdom, France, and Germany reactivated against Iran. Those sanctions include an international arms embargo that will hinder Iranian efforts to rebuild its offensive capabilities with foreign assistance.

Second, the United States should support an international effort to establish a new Palestinian governing authority that opposes Hamas and can rebuild the Gaza Strip.

That authority could manage the distribution of aid, housing of displaced Gazans, and administration and reconstruction of the strip. It could supplant Hamas as the primary political power in the strip and gradually erode Hamas’s influence. This is the most effective way to create long-term peace in the Gaza Strip; military operations cannot achieve this effect alone, because they challenge Hamas at the military level but not the political one. The international community would, of course, need to support a new governing authority with financial and security assistance, especially as that authority works to destroy the remaining Hamas remnants. Egypt and the Gulf states are well poised to assist here.

Third, the United States should aggressively support the full implementation of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement, which requires that the Lebanese government and military remove Hezbollah forces from southern Lebanon and prevent the group from rebuilding militarily. Newly elected Lebanese leaders have voiced their desire to disarm Hezbollah promptly. Hezbollah has responded characteristically with threats to the government, highlighting the risk inherent in trying to disarm the group. But Hezbollah is weaker now than at any point in decades; Washington has a rare window of opportunity to defeat a terror group that has long antagonized the United States and killed many Americans. The United States should also explore how to collaborate with regional partners and use sanctions to prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting.

Fourth, the United States must support long-term Syrian stability and a political order that integrates all ethno-religious minorities, reconciles rival political factions, and destroys Assad-era militant and criminal networks that seek to destabilize the country. Promoting such stability requires maintaining the US force presence in Syria as part of the international coalition to defeat ISIS. The United States should also pressure the transitional government and its backer, Turkey, to build a broad-based and fully representative political system. The United States should similarly press the transitional government to pursue fair and transparent justice against former Assad regime officials who committed crimes against the Syrian people. Doing so would minimize the appeal to some Syrian elements of supporting anti-government networks tied to Bashar al Assad and potentially aligned with Iran.

Fifth, the United States should increase support for—rather than abandon—Iraqi leaders who wish to see their country independent from Iranian domination. The United States should retain its force presence in Iraq, as it empowers those Iraqi leaders, and collaborate with them to constrain and marginalize Iranian-backed militias. Washington must also be prepared to use force against those militias should they again threaten US service members. The militias stopped attacking US personnel after the United States threatened their key leaders, many of whom are designated terrorists. The United States can maintain this deterrence while exploring political and economic measures with Iraqi leaders to minimize Iranian influence there. The militias will respond threateningly, which is why Iraqi leaders need US backing and protection.

Finally, the United States should seek to render the Houthis unwilling to attack international shipping and US partners. The Houthis are currently willing to do both. Airstrikes alone cannot deter the Houthis. And the United States cannot tolerate a future wherein transit through the Red Sea and Gulf of Oman is under the constant threat of Houthi attack. That would imperil US sailors and vessels transiting the region and continue inflating shipping prices. The United States should specifically be prepared to support local partners in conducting offensive ground operations against the Houthis. A committed US effort to back partners in challenging Houthi political control is the most straightforward—and perhaps only—path to render the Houthis unwilling to conduct attacks outside Yemen.

Pray.

Train.

Stay informed.

Build resilient communities.

—END REPORT