Be respectful in your interactions with fellow members. You can Go Here to read our Terms and Rules. Visit My Profile to create your avatar and see your posts. If you to report a bug or issue, email us at support.GI US.com

Title: October 22, 2025

GRAY ZONE BRIEF 22 OCTOBER 2025

U.S. ARMY

Army counterintelligence agents to get enhanced arrest powers

Civilian special agents of the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Command will receive enhanced authorities to conduct searches, execute warrants and make arrests outside of military bases, Army counterintelligence leaders announced to members of the media during an Oct. 15 roundtable at the Association of the United States Army’s annual conference in Washington, D.C.

Title 10 U.S. Code Section 7377, written into the National Defense Authorization Act of 2025, will give the Army’s civilian CI agents authorities that now correspond with civilian law enforcement agencies to conduct law enforcement activities outside of military installations, Lt. Gen. Anthony Hale, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Intelligence (DA G-2), told reporters.

The Department of Defense’s implementing guidance for these authorities must be approved by the Attorney General.

Army CI agents are tasked with ferreting out espionage by foreign adversaries, and regularly work with federal and local law enforcement agencies nationwide to combat threats to national security. Their jurisdiction is limited to counterintelligence and national security investigations, including countering international terrorism.

In addition to allowing special agents within Army Counterintelligence to pursue leads off bases, the new authorities will also facilitate their ability to support other law enforcement agencies.

Why It Matters:

Army CI agents were formerly unable to conduct searches, execute warrants or make arrests outside of military installations owing to legal challenges due to the Army’s limited jurisdiction within the United States and the nature of their investigations.

UKRAINIAN DRONES FOR THE UK & THE EU

Mass production of Ukrainian interceptor drones in the United Kingdom is gearing up, as the war-torn country transitions to licensed production of domestically designed weapons in partner countries.

Speaking at a press conference on Oct. 20, British Secretary of State for Defense John Healey said the joint manufacturing project, dubbed Octopus, would begin “within weeks.

The announcement comes a few days after Ukraine’s government-backed defense technology group Brave1 identified a handful of weapon categories (https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/10/15/ukraine-made-drones-navigation-software-primed-for-first-exports/) deemed fit for export to Western allies. Over the last few months, Kyiv has explored the possibility of easing its arms transfer ban.

In July, leaders launched a new initiative to authorize allied countries, such as members of the Ramstein group of global backers, to produce Ukrainian systems locally. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has warned that this process will be gradual and will only entail a partial and regulated lift of restrictions limited to weapons in surplus.

According to Healey, the Octopus interceptor, a proven system against Shahed-type attack drones, will become the foundation of the so-called European “drone wall” to deter further Russian aerial threats.

This joint partnership could result in the production rate of around 2,000 units per month, Bloomberg reported on Oct. 10.

Why it Matters:

In September, the privately-owned Ukrainian drone manufacturer Ukrspecsystems announced that it was investing over $267 million in the building of a new factory in Mildenhall, U.K.

The interceptor in question was developed in Ukraine with the support of UK technicians and staff, but reportedly costs less than 10% of the systems it was conceived to target.

Britain is doubling down on its drone capabilities, as Healey also announced the creation of a new U.K. Drone Centre, adding that investments in drone and other autonomous systems would double to total more than £4 billion ($5 billion). The country has committed to spending 10% of its equipment budget on new technologies, starting this year.

U.S. AIR FORCE

Northrop eyes more B-21 contracts, Air Force deal to speed production

Northrop Grumman expects to receive new U.S. Air Force contracts for its B-21 Raider stealth bomber program by the end of the year, the defense firm’s Chief Executive Officer Kathy Warden said Tuesday.

And Northrop continues to work with the Air Force on a potential agreement to accelerate production of the B-21, Warden said in an earnings call with investors.The budget reconciliation bill Congress passed in July provides $4.5 billion to speed up production of the B-21. Warden said Northrop remains in active discussion with the Air Force on how to get that done, although the federal government shutdown has slowed those conversations.

If such a deal is struck, Warden said, Northrop plans to make more investments to increase its production rate. An acceleration of the B-21 program would mean higher revenue for Northrop in 2026, Warden said, but she declined to predict how much it could raise.

The Air Force plans to buy at least 100 B-21s to replace its aging and retiring fleets of B-2 Spirit stealth bombers and B-1 Lancers sometime in the 2030s. If the service chose to buy more than 100 B-21s, as it has been considering, Warden said that would be handled in a different negotiation process from the production acceleration discussions.

Warden said the program is on track to receive a contract for the third low-rate initial production lot of the B-21 and an advance procurement contract to begin acquiring components and resources to build the fifth lot in the fourth quarter of 2025.

The start of flight tests for the second B-21, which began in September, represents a “significant milestone” for the program, Warden said. It also marks the beginning of a new phase in B-21 flight testing, beyond general flight performance to integrating its weapons and mission systems, she said.

Multiple other B-21s are now in ground testing in preparation for their first flights, Warden said, which will validate their performance and minimize their risk.

Why It Matters:

In April, Northrop announced it had taken a $477 million loss on the B-21 program, which it attributed to a production process change meant to allow the company to build bombers faster.

Ken Crews, Northrop’s chief financial officer, said on Tuesday that producing the B-21’s engineering and manufacturing development flight test aircraft cost more than expected, which in turn increased Northrop’s anticipated cost of building the low-rate initial production bombers.

But a contract restructuring on the B-21 that reduced the company’s expected losses on the remaining low-rate initial production lots all but erased those higher costs, Crews said, and was essentially a wash.

RUSSO-UKRAINE WAR

Key Takeaways:

1 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia is unwilling to agree to an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine that does not result in Ukraine’s complete capitulation.

2 Ukraine and its European allies signaled their support for U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal for an immediate ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.

3 Recent Russian war crimes in Pokrovsk highlight the humanitarian cost of Russian advances in more populated areas.

4 Russia’s long-range strike campaign continues to target critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025-2026.

5 Ukrainian Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed as the commander of the newly formed Joint Forces Task Force.

6 Polish and Romanian authorities connected Russian military intelligence to attempted acts of sabotage aimed at undermining European Union (EU) support to Ukraine.

7 Russian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Pokrovsk.

GZB INFOCUS: THE RUSSO-UKRAINE WAR:

TWO PERSPECTIVES

*Analyst Commentary: A friend and geopolitical analyst I correspond with, recently attended the Warsaw Security Forum in Poland. She said the mood was with an immediacy to meet the threat of continental risk.

Another colleague attended the Association of the United States Army conference in D.C. and met with policymakers, analysts and business leaders, the mood was more detached – strategic rather than existential. The perspectives there as compared to here are starkly different.

Front-Line Anxiety

In Warsaw, Poland’s fears mirror Romania’s. Policymakers, academics and military officers share a conviction that the war in Ukraine is only one phase of a broader conflict Russia envisions with the West – with Europe as its primary theater. They see NATO’s eastern flank, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, as still insufficiently prepared from a defense standpoint.

Deterrence, in their view, has worked largely because the U.S. military presence in Poland and Romania has dissuaded Moscow from direct engagement. Yet even as both nations rearm and invest more than 2 percent of their gross domestic product in defense, they know that fighting Russia would mean confronting an adversary that, though weakened, retains hard-earned experience in large-scale land warfare. Only Ukraine possesses comparable experience today.

As several high-ranking officers and defense experts from Poland, Romania, Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S. have told me, NATO’s post-Cold War combat record has little resemblance to what is unfolding in Ukraine: a full-scale, combined arms invasion supported by every domain of modern warfare.

People wonder why I jump on these NGO or Defense webcasts any chance I get — because if there’s a Q&A, I’m registered as an analyst with all the important entities — and this gives me access on those platforms to ask questions to those levels of leadership.

The Evolution of Modern Warfare & OSINT

Conversations in both Warsaw and Washington have underscored how the Russia-Ukraine war has transformed conventional warfare, serving as both a testing ground and a catalyst for innovation. Three developments stand out.

First, information has been democratized. Commercial satellite imagery now gives governments, journalists and even civilians near-real-time visibility into the battlefield. I always say, “I can watch Russian troop movements on my IPhone from my couch and build OSINT products in only a few hours.”

Without this capability—GRAY ZONE BRIEF would not exist.

What was once the sole domain of state intelligence is now accessible to anyone. Ukraine has used this transparency not only for tactical advantage but also to counter Russian disinformation and maintain credibility with Western partners. Open-source intelligence communities now function as informal extensions of the battlefield, analyzing data that informs public opinion, strategic decisions and even sanctions policies. This unprecedented fusion of military and civilian insight has made secrecy far harder to preserve.

Second, Ukraine’s innovation in drone warfare has redefined adaptation under pressure.

While everyone acknowledges that U.S. and European financial and military support have been critical to sustaining Ukraine’s resistance, less attention has been given to the country’s creativity in developing new capabilities. Military units frequently identify their own operational needs and collaborate directly with engineers and small firms to design and deploy tools in weeks instead of years. This decentralized model has given Ukraine a technological edge over Russia, especially in drone warfare. Drones have become force multipliers, enabling Ukraine to offset its numerical inferiority and strike Russian logistics, command centers and even naval assets in the Black Sea.

Third, the war has reaffirmed the primacy of human will. Ukraine’s national resilience surprised even its allies – and certainly Moscow. Few anticipated that Ukraine would mobilize such a sustained and cohesive national effort to defend its sovereignty. But that resilience carries a heavy cost, and managing manpower amid exhaustion and loss has become Kyiv’s most pressing challenge.

Russia, by contrast, has worked to insulate its population from the war’s toll. After its partial mobilization triggered mass flight and unrest in fall 2022, the Kremlin shifted toward financial incentives to attract volunteers – including from abroad. Some foreign recruits seek Russian citizenship or high pay, while others – such as North Korean contingents – represent direct aid from allied states, implicitly backed by China. This outsourcing shields Moscow from the political fallout of large-scale domestic mobilization and sustains its narrative of endurance under sanctions.

The democratization of intelligence and the rise of drones and other technologies are reshaping how wars are fought, but the outcome still depends on the determination of people – both those on the front lines and those supporting them from behind. This lesson seems to be resonating in Washington. At the AUSA meeting, Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll called on the military to shed its reliance on decades-old technology and outdated acquisition strategies. Instead, he envisions an agile force that can match or surpass potential adversaries through mastery of drone warfare and an acquisition system flexible enough to field cutting-edge technologies in months rather than years.

The Politics of Ceasefire

In Warsaw, discussions turned repeatedly to the question of how – or whether – a ceasefire could emerge. Few expect lasting peace, and most fear that any pause in fighting would benefit Moscow, allowing it to regroup and recalibrate before a new offensive. Yet others argued that Europe itself needs time – to rearm, rebuild its defense industries and strengthen unity – and that Russia knows it. Therefore, if Russia is indeed intent on testing NATO or directly challenging Europe, it may not wait long.

Two incidents illustrate what many see as Russia’s strategy of probing NATO’s military readiness and political resolve. In one, a Russian naval drone attacked a vessel in the Danube’s internal waters, evading radar detection. (In previous instances, radar systems picked up aerial drones that had strayed into Romanian territory.) In the second incident, a swarm of drones entered Polish airspace during Russia’s Zapad military exercises. Though differing tactically, both operations appeared designed to test U.S.-operated radars – the backbone of early warning systems on NATO’s eastern flank – and gauge Washington’s political response.

Across the region, concern is mounting that Ukraine’s human and material resources are thinning faster than Western resolve can replenish them. The asymmetry is clear: Moscow can escalate horizontally – through cyber or hybrid means – while NATO remains intent on avoiding a direct confrontation.

In Washington, meanwhile, U.S. experts and policymakers acknowledged the escalation risks inherent in continued military aid. At the same time, financial support has its own downsides. The United States fears an unstable Russia and a nuclear Russia in equal measure. While Europeans emphasize the danger of Russia testing NATO’s credibility and readiness, their American counterparts stress the importance of avoiding a direct confrontation with Russia at all costs. The U.S. view is rather simple: European deterrence must carry the first burden. The official line is that the U.S. is fully committed to defending NATO principles. Unofficially, however, U.S. experts explained that while the United States would support those European allies that had made serious commitments to strengthening their defense capabilities, they were unsure whether Washington would go to war to defend European interests deemed peripheral to its own.

Washington’s pragmatic stance is being refined as the administration prepares a new national security strategy and reviews its global posture.

Despite the noise emanating from think tanks, the media and Congress, everyone I speak to in these think tanks agree that the real decisions are taking place within the White House, among a small circle of senior advisers and national security officials. The central question remains how to balance America’s enduring commitment to European security with Indo-Pacific priorities and growing domestic fatigue.

Washington is now enduring a government shutdown. Discontent is evident across both parties. The protests that took place over the weekend underscore the rising wave of opposition and frustration with the White House, reinforcing the sense that Washington’s political energy is being nipped at by internal discord.

At the same time, the choreography of diplomacy continued. U.S. President Donald Trump met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a day after speaking with Russian President Vladimir Putin. By the end of the week, there was renewed talk of potential negotiations between the U.S. and Russia. This sequence of events reflects the tightrope Washington is trying to walk: offering support to Kyiv while keeping diplomatic channels open with Moscow.

The U.S. is determined to manage escalation, preserve flexibility and avoid being drawn into a conflict that could spiral far beyond Europe’s borders.

Washington, D.C., still radiates power. Since post WWII, there has been a pervasive sense that this is where the decisions that will define the direction of global affairs are made.

In Warsaw, the war in Ukraine feels existential. In Washington, it feels like a variable in a larger equation encompassing the balance of power in Europe, Asia and the United States itself. Yet the two perspectives are inseparable. The outcome in Ukraine, and perhaps the future of European stability, will hinge not just on Ukrainian resilience or European rearmament, but on whether Washington’s political will matches its strategic ambition.

Pray.

Train.

Stay informed.

Build resilient communities.

—END REPORT