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Title: November 26, 2025

GRAY ZONE BRIEF 26 NOVEMBER 2025

ISW Key Takeaways:

• Iran’s Relationship to Iranian-backed Militias: Unspecified Iranian officials told The Telegraph on November 25 that the Houthis and some unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have become less responsive to Tehran. The Iranian officials mischaracterized Iran’s relationship with the Houthis and Iraqi militias by misrepresenting how the Axis of Resistance functions. These Iranian officials probably cast the Houthis as an “independent” actor to encourage Saudi-mediated negotiations with the United States to move forward.

• ISIS-affiliates in Syria: Syrian authorities dismantled an Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)-affiliated cell in Latakia Province, indicating that ISIS-affiliated groups may seek to conduct clandestine activities or attacks in coastal Syria. The Syrian Ministry of Interior’s characterization of the cell in Latakia Province indicates that the cell was part of Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah rather than ISIS.

***GZB Note: Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah:

Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah is a Sunni Islamist militant organization operating in Syria and Lebanon, described as anti-Shia, anti-Alawite, anti-Druze, and anti-Christian. Its stated goal is to establish an Islamic State in Syria that excludes Alawites, Druze, Christians, and Shia.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, the group "appears to support IS and share its extremist ideology." Though the group has denied that it cooperates with ISIS, it has stated that cooperation with it "may happen in the future and will be announced as it happens." Abu al-Fath al-Shami, head of Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah's Sharia division, stated that the organization has not pledged allegiance to ISIS's leader and is not affiliated with him, but added that "whoever agrees with us in pure monotheism and sincere jihad has our brotherhood."

This is a prime example of how once hotly-disputed differences between Jihadist Groups regarding their particular brands of Sharia, have now set aside differences to work together, thus forming the greater “Army of the Mahdi,” which according to Islamic eschatology will come out of Syria, specifically “The White Mosque” or the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus.

• Weapons Smuggling in Iran: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Forces interdicted a shipment of explosive devices, weapons, and ammunition reportedly smuggled by Kurdistan Workers’ Party-linked fighters into northwestern Iran on November 25.

IRAN & THE HOUTHIS

Unspecified Iranian officials told The Telegraph on November 25 that the Houthis and some unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have become less responsive to Tehran. The Iranian officials mischaracterized Iran’s relationship with the Houthis and Iraqi militias by misrepresenting how the Axis of Resistance functions, however.

The Telegraph, citing unspecified Iranian officials, reported on November 25 that Iran has lost control over the Houthis and struggles to maintain cohesion among groups within its Axis of Resistance. The officials claimed that the Houthis have rejected Iranian directives and have “gone rogue for a while and are now really rebels.”

These officials‘ claims misrepresent the fundamental nature of the Iran-Houthi relationship. The Houthis view themselves as a coequal partner to Iran rather than as an Iranian proxy. Iran and the Houthis share strategic alignment over key objectives, but the Houthis have historically pursued objectives for their own benefit as well as Iran’s. Both Iran and the Houthis aim to decrease US influence in the region to impose their own vision of a regional order.

Iran has long viewed the Houthis as a partner that can help implement this vision, even though the Houthis sometimes have divergent aims. This relationship is consistent with Iran‘s relationship with many other Axis of Resistance organizations. The Axis of Resistance ”makes decisions and coordinates through [informal] channels, making the alliance appear amorphous and opaque to external observers.” The informal and amorphous nature of the alliance is by design, and it enables Iranian officials to disavow its partners when politically convenient to do so.

AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN

**Taliban reports at least 10 killed in Pakistani air strikes in Afghan province** -

Pakistan launched airstrikes on Afghanistan’s Khost, Kunar, and Paktika provinces on Tuesday, killing at least 10 civilians, including nine children, in Khost, according to a Taliban spokesman. The strikes followed a suicide bombing in Peshawar that killed three Pakistani security officers, which Islamabad blamed on militants operating from Afghan territory. Tensions between the two countries have worsened since the Taliban’s 2021 return to power, with Pakistan accusing Kabul of sheltering Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters. Afghanistan denies the claim and accuses Pakistan of violating its sovereignty. The renewed violence threatens a fragile ceasefire brokered last month.

SUDAN.

**Sudan’s RSF Announces Unilateral Three-Month Humanitarian Ceasefire** - Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) announced a unilateral three-month humanitarian ceasefire on Monday, reportedly in response to international pressure led by the United States, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo said the truce aims to facilitate aid delivery and protect civilians amid the country’s worsening humanitarian crisis. The move came a day after army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan rejected the Quad’s proposal, calling it biased. Both sides have been accused of atrocities in a war that has killed tens of thousands and displaced millions.

DISINFORMATION

**The Human Algorithm: Why Disinformation Outruns Truth and What It Means for Our Future **- Human nature is quickly becoming a national security concern. Jennifer Ewbank, Former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Digital Innovation, argues that disinformation spreads fastest not because of technology alone but because human psychology—our attraction to novelty, emotion, and identity—makes falsehoods travel farther than facts. Adversaries exploit these instincts, a problem accelerated by AI. Ewbank advocates strengthening the “human algorithm” through quick, relatable truth-telling, simple accuracy checks, and cultivating “Mind Sovereignty.”

GZB INFOCUS: THE U.S. & LEBANON

The Lebanese army is facing increasing pressure from both the U.S. and Israel to strengthen its efforts to disarm Hezbollah. Its lack of progress on this front thwarted a planned visit by army commander Gen. Rudolph Haykal to Washington last week. The unprecedented cancellation came after Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham objected to a statement issued by the army that described Israel as “the enemy,” after Israeli forces fired on troops from the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon.

The cancellation also aimed to send a message to President Joseph Aoun, who personally selected the commander in consultation with U.S. officials. The Lebanese army is indeed reluctant to resort to tough measures to disarm Hezbollah. Aoun and Haykal must abide by the dictates of the country’s political system, which emerged in 1989 after the end of a bloody 14-year civil war, making the president’s prerogatives largely symbolic. Parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, an ally of Hezbollah, is the de facto center of power in Lebanese politics, so rebuffing the president and the army commander will not change anything. But the Lebanese political system’s inability to make consequential decisions is not a failure of individuals; it is a failure of institutions. This paper sheds light on the inherent limitations of this system.

Mounting Pressure

The U.S. is the primary supporter of the Lebanese army, which has 60,000 soldiers, only 9,000 of whom serve south of the Litani River. Since 2006, U.S. military aid to Lebanon has totaled $3 billion, though much of the equipment it has provided is outdated. The U.S. has also invested significantly in training for the army. Since reaching a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel a year ago, Washington has had high expectations that the army can disarm Hezbollah. It has also urged Lebanese authorities to cut off Iranian funding for Hezbollah, as well as Hezbollah’s own support for allies outside Lebanon. But slow progress in removing Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon has frustrated the U.S. government, prompting it to increase pressure on the Lebanese government.

Over the past year, the Lebanese army has reinforced its deployment in southern Lebanon and begun to dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure south of the Litani River, about 18 miles (29 kilometers) from the border with Israel, in accordance with the government-approved peace plan. The first phase of the plan called for ending Hezbollah’s presence in the border area by the end of 2025. But even this condition does not meet U.S. and Israeli demands to completely disarm Hezbollah throughout the country within the same period. The army believes those demands are impossible to implement in this timeframe.

At the same time, Hezbollah has refused to disarm north of the Litani River, citing U.N. Security Council resolution 1701, which ended the July 2006 war and defined the demilitarized zone south of the river. The U.S. and Israel insist that Hezbollah’s support of Hamas after Hamas’ attack on Oct. 7, 2023, has created a new military reality that the combatants must respect.

The ceasefire monitoring mechanism demands that the Lebanese army search every village, town and house in southern Lebanon for weapons. But the Israeli military says that the mechanism is not working quickly enough and that, to fulfill its obligations, every house in the entire country, not just the south, must be searched. The Lebanese army says it does not have the technical capabilities or manpower to comb large areas, including rugged valleys, searching for weapons. It’s stalling on disarming Hezbollah to avoid provoking a military confrontation, given the consequences such an effort could have for cohesion within the army itself and the country as a whole, as evidenced by what has happened in Syria and Sudan.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is not enthusiastic about Aoun’s desire to open indirect negotiations with Israel within the framework of the five-member committee that oversees the ceasefire, which in addition to Lebanon and Israel includes the U.S., France and UNIFIL. Israel believes that Lebanon is hiding behind the committee, hoping the Israeli military will withdraw entirely from the positions it occupied last year in exchange for vague promises to disarm Hezbollah at an unspecified date.

Army’s Limitations

The Lebanese army’s unwillingness to disarm Hezbollah has led to intensifying Israeli attacks on Hezbollah positions and personnel. But the government in Beirut fears the repercussions of implementing the terms of the ceasefire, which require the state to assert a monopoly on weapons in the country. Hezbollah’s unwillingness to comply does not hinge on what its secretary-general, Naim Qassem, says. Instead, it depends on what Iran decides, given that Tehran created the group and has helped it develop into a key player in Lebanon’s military and political landscape since 1982.

It’s a mistake to assume that Iran will allow Hezbollah’s disarmament without a comprehensive agreement with Washington that leads to the lifting of Western sanctions.

The obsession with arms is why Hezbollah stubbornly maneuvers to maintain at least some of its armed presence to preserve its political influence. The group says it will not discuss complete disarmament until Israel ceases its attacks and withdraws from the occupied territories, including Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shuba Hill – which Israel will not do. Hezbollah has also continued its efforts to rebuild its military capabilities. Its extensive arsenal was the cornerstone of its propaganda claim that it was Lebanon’s main protector against Israeli ambitions, enabling it to dominate the country’s political system.

Disarming it would therefore deprive its political wing of its leverage. Lebanese officials argue that Israeli strikes, which have expanded in scope and intensity, give Hezbollah an excuse to cling to its weapons.

Lebanon finds itself under pressure from both the U.S. and Israel, with the former threatening to cut military aid and scale down political ties and the latter launching daily air raids and targeting Hezbollah personnel to force it to lay down its arms and convince the Lebanese army to shoulder responsibility for disarmament. The army claims it legally cannot search homes for weapons, except on the authority of the public prosecutor, which occasionally grants the military search warrants in individual cases.

Army leadership fears that house searches would inevitably lead to clashes with local Shiite communities and the defection of Shiite soldiers. According to unofficial figures, 45 percent of Lebanese troops are Shiites.

In dealing with Lebanon, Israel behaves as if it won the war. It views future negotiations from a position of strength, insisting on Hezbollah’s complete disarmament and the establishment of a buffer zone south of the Litani. Israel is actively engaged, with U.S. consent, in a one-sided war of attrition against Hezbollah to make the cost of engagement unbearable for the Iranian proxy.

The Lebanese army is determined to avoid military confrontation with any Lebanese sect – which could lead to the country’s disintegration. In 2008, for example, military commanders refused to follow government orders to dismantle Hezbollah’s fiber optic network and dismiss a pro-Hezbollah Shiite officer from his position as head of security at Beirut airport. Hezbollah responded to the order by storming the predominantly Sunni western part of Beirut.

Last week, Lebanon’s army commander criticized Israel, calling it the enemy and accusing it of violating Lebanese sovereignty, destabilizing the country and obstructing the army’s deployment in the south. His comments angered the administration in Washington, surprising Lebanese officials because many in Lebanon have described Israel as the enemy since 1948. The 1949 armistice between Lebanon and Israel was between two enemy states. Even the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel and their exchange of full diplomatic relations since 1978 did not prevent Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi from referring to Israel as an enemy of the Arabs at the Arab-Islamic summit held in Doha last September.

The U.S. has demanded changes to the Lebanese army’s doctrine, established by former President Emile Lahoud when he was army commander in the early 1990s. The doctrine focuses on resisting Israel, which was considered Lebanon’s sole enemy. For the U.S., it’s no longer acceptable for its ally, Lebanon, to refer to Israel as the enemy. However, changing the doctrine would require a seismic shift in security posture, followed by a shift in the local political balance that would result in the production of a new political class. This can happen only as a result of a war from abroad that overthrows Hezbollah and enables the army to take control of internal security and shift the rules of the political game away from involvement in the security and ideological problems of the Middle East.

Conclusions

Lebanon is inherently unstable because of its heterogeneous population, which identifies with foreign countries, and because it has failed to meet the core criteria for a cohesive national entity. The country has consistently sought outside help to solve, and often mitigate, its domestic problems, and the Hezbollah question is no exception. Since independence in 1943, Lebanon has had 12 presidents, five of them army commanders. Both the presidency and army commander position are reserved for Maronite Christians. But consensus among the country’s religious sects is a requirement to occupy the highest public office in Lebanon.

This reality explains, at least in part, why army commanders have never sought to weaken Hezbollah, preferring instead to accommodate it. Two presidents, three prime ministers and many celebrities lost their lives in Lebanon because they charted an independent political course.

Lebanon has always needed foreign intervention to address its domestic problems. The U.S. and Egypt resolved Lebanon’s 1958 crisis, and Saudi Arabia led a collective Arab effort to end the 1975-89 civil war.

Ironically, the U.S. and Israel now want Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah, a regional problem planted by Iran. But if they are indeed interested in disarming Hezbollah, they will have to do it themselves; at this point, the Lebanese government and army are mere spectators in the struggle over the country’s future.

**Note: GRAY ZONE BRIEF aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Jihadist Extremists and their coalition of Terrorists globally and here on U.S. soil. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of foreign policy. It also provides insights into AQ, Daesh/ISIS and Islamic Brotherhood sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

GRAY ZONE BRIEF will provide regular updates, including daily updates, as the activity of Jihadist terror orgs or crisis warrants.

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