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Title: August 5, 2025

DOMESTIC SITREP

NITAZENES — NEW DEADLIER DRUG

Deadly drug stronger than fentanyl spreads rapidly across the Americas, experts warn.

Nitazenes can be up to 10 times more potent than fentanyl, but routine drug screens don't detect them.

A little-known opioid that’s deadlier than fentanyl has led to a growing number of overdose deaths in recent years. GZB started tracking this several years back when “Tranq” started creating “zombies” and rotting addicts flesh off.

A former addict who was patrolling the streets of Philadelphia was offering help and rehab options to addicts and using Narcan on Overdose victims of Fentanyl— and came across users on Nitazenes. Narcan doesn’t work on synthetic opioids. You OD, you die.

Nitazenes, a class of synthetic opioids were originally developed as pain relievers in the 1950s, but were never approved for use due to the high overdose risk, according to a report from the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD).

Starting in 2019, nitazenes (benzimidazole-opioids) began to enter the illicit drug market in Europe, where they have been reported on almost every continent.

Nitazenes are available in pills, powders, sprays and other forms. They can be snorted, smoked, injected or taken orally.

In addition to potentially fatal overdoses, the drugs are known to cause dependency, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, disorientation, loss of consciousness, cardiac arrest and seizures, according to the CICAD report.

The other issue is that people usually don’t know they’re taking them.

Nitazenes are often mixed into heroin, pressed pills or even stimulants — so someone might think they’re using one thing and end up taking something completely different.

Why It Matters:

• CICAD’s report suggests that "nitazene use is a growing trend in North America and that availability is likely spreading across the Americas."

The most prevalent type of nitazene is isotonitazene (ISO), but at least a dozen others have been identified, the report stated.

• The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) classifies ISO as a Schedule 1 drug along with seven other nitazenes.

• Because they’re synthetic and cheap to make, they’ve become a popular option for illegal manufacturers

• Nitazenes are being produced in illicit labs overseas, mostly in places like China and India, and are getting trafficked into the U.S. through the same channels used for fentanyl.

• This is yet another evolution of China’s Unrestricted Warfare on the United States and Europe. They will keep manufacturing newer and deadlier iterations of deadly drugs — which in average over the past decade has killed 100,000 Americans per year.

They are chipping away at our citizenry and our military age makes and playing the long game — death by a thousand cuts.

GLOBAL SITREP

RUSSIA

Russia unbound. On Aug. 4, Russia’s Foreign Ministry said Moscow no longer considers itself bound to the self-imposed restrictions regarding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The statement is a response to what Russia sees as provocation from the United States and its allies. It alleges the U.S. has set a precedent for transferring land-based systems to European NATO countries, for delivering Typhon medium-range missile systems to the Philippines, and testing and training launches of the PrSM missile. Combined with Western statements about ensuring the long-term presence of such systems in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, Moscow says, this creates a direct threat to Russian national security.

GERMANY — TOO LITTLE TOO LATE?

German decline. A recent survey by German broadcaster RND showed that 59 percent of Germans would “probably not” or “definitely not” defend their country militarily if it were attacked. Only 16 percent said they would “definitely” take up arms, with an additional 22 percent indicating they “probably” would, leaving just 38 percent potentially willing to fight. These findings potentially challenge Germany’s plans to expand its military, including its ambitions to recruit 40,000 new troops annually and grow active forces to 260,000 by 2035.

RUSSIA IN DECLINE

Das Vedanya. Nearly 130 small towns in Russia, where some 3.4 million people live, are disappearing. Over the past decade, the number of residents in small towns has decreased by 314,000, thanks largely to job losses. Unsurprisingly, the greatest exoduses are in northern towns that support coal, metallurgical and timber industries. In response, Moscow has allocated 4 billion rubles ($50 million) for the implementation of investment projects focused on infrastructure development for more than 100 such towns, and it has established new standards to determine which of Russia’s 170 state-run companies will be relocated from Moscow to peripheral regions.

INDIA, THE U.S. & RUSSIAN OIL

India bristles. Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval arrived in Moscow for a high-level visit aimed at enhancing defense and energy cooperation amid escalating tensions with the U.S. Though the trip had already been scheduled, it took on added significance after U.S. President Donald Trump threatened new tariffs on India over its continued purchase of Russian oil. India’s Ministry of External Affairs criticized the move, noting that New Delhi bought Russian oil with Washington’s approval to help stabilize global markets. It also drew attention to the scale of economic ties among India, the U.S., the EU and Russia. The external affairs minister will travel to Russia later this month ahead of an annual India-Russia summit.

THAILAND & CAMBODIA

Solidifying peace. Thai and Cambodian officials are holding talks in Kuala Lumpur this week following deadly border clashes between the two countries late last month. The meetings will cover six pivotal issues, including the ceasefire agreement reached last week, the withdrawal of troops, safe zones, and setting up local coordination channels. They will also hold ministerial-level talks Aug. 7.

THE EU SANCTIONING CHINA

Targeting Beijing. The EU plans to impose sanctions against China over its support for Russia in the war with Ukraine, according to a Politico report The news comes following a Reuters report that Beijing has supplied Moscow with drone engines labeled as “industrial refrigeration units.” Some 15 EU countries have contacted China inquiring about these supplies, but Beijing has so far either denied its involvement or refused to respond.

THE U.S., ISRAEL & RUSSIA

Israeli mediation. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reportedly been working in recent weeks to reduce tensions between the United States and Russia over several matters. Netanyahu spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin twice in the past week – on July 28 and Aug. 4 – about the progress of his efforts. U.S. President Donald Trump is reportedly also aware of Netanyahu’s mediation attempts.

JAPAN & AUSTRALIA

Budding partnership. Japan will be a key partner in Australia's program to build a new fleet of general-purpose frigates, Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles said. He added that Australia has selected the Mogami-class frigate designed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries as the “preferred platform” for its 10 billion Australian dollar ($6.5 billion) project.

U.S. WEAPONS TO UKRAINE — VIKINGS FOOTING THE BILL

New initiative. The U.S. and NATO announced the launch of a new initiative to support Ukraine. The Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List will enable alliance members and partners to finance the supply of U.S.-made weapons and military equipment for Kyiv. Denmark, Norway and Sweden have so far pledged 500 million euros ($578 million) for the fund.

GZB MIDDLE EAST INFOCUS:

Israel At An Unsustainable Tipping Point

Israel has been fighting what’s become a multifront war for two years. And unlike its previous wars, there is no defined timeline, no geographic scope and no clear condition for victory. It’s an open-ended contest in which military success alone may not ensure strategic sustainability.

Sustainability depends not just on battlefield performance but also on whether Israeli manpower, economic resilience, political cohesion and strategic direction can weather the storm. The demands of simultaneous high-tempo operations are testing traditional strengths like rapid reserve mobilization and cutting-edge technology.

Perhaps most challenging is whether Israel’s warfighting posture can be sustained across the full architecture of national capacity. This includes the strain on military personnel, where sustained mobilization is producing signs of fatigue and refusal; economic health, marked by escalating fiscal burdens and pressure on growth and investor confidence; the erosion of domestic cohesion under prolonged uncertainty; and the widening gap between strategic objectives and the ability to achieve them.

Israel’s defense doctrine rests on the assumption that its reserve system can be rapidly mobilized and sustained across multiple campaigns. That assumption is now under visible pressure. Roughly 300,000 reservists remain mobilized, a staggering figure for a nation of 9.7 million, pulling heavily from vital civilian sectors and younger age cohorts.

Many have undergone multiple deployments since October 2023, with compressed rotation schedules and diminishing recovery periods. Units drawn from Israel’s high-tech and middle-class sectors are experiencing growing absenteeism as part of a broader crisis of disengagement driven by financial pressure, operational fatigue and skepticism over whether the stated goal of dismantling Hamas remains achievable.

With just 170,000 active-duty personnel, the Israel Defense Forces cannot maintain multitheater operations without leaning heavily on its reserves. This places disproportionate pressure on a system once seen as a pillar of national resilience.

Participation rates have fallen sharply: Initial mobilization peaked at 120 percent, but by 2025, actual participation had dropped to as low as 60 percent. Reserve service is legally mandated, but enforcement has been inconsistent, reflecting institutional reluctance to escalate internal tensions and the limits of compelling mass compliance. Many reservists have delayed reporting through informal deferrals, medical exemptions and protest.

The very composition of Israel’s force model is similarly strained. The IDF relies on a small standing army and a large reserve system to scale up and sustain operations. As participation drops, this model becomes harder to execute. Once a unifying institution that bridged social divides through shared service, the reserve system is now fraying under demographic shifts and perceived inequities in who sacrifices – and how much they give up.

Without retooling this structure – either through rotation, doctrinal adaptation, clarified objectives or phased demobilization – Israel could imperil the very manpower that underpins its deterrence capabilities. And operational shortfalls are only part of the cost: As reservists disengage, training pipelines stall, unit cohesion erodes, and the credibility of rapid mobilization declines. This could encourage adversaries to test Israel on multiple fronts.

Meanwhile, the shock to Israel’s wartime economy has been unlike any in its modern history. Since October 2023, cumulative war costs have reached approximately $67 billion, or 7-8 percent of gross domestic product, despite unfettered U.S. aid. Defense spending has grown from 4.2 percent to nearly 8 percent, raising the fiscal deficit to around 7 percent in 2024 before stabilizing near 4.2 percent in 2025 under emergency budget measures.

Spending is only the tip of the iceberg. Labor shortages resulting from reservist mobilization are estimated to cost up to $600 million per week in lost output – a figure compounded by the suspension of Palestinian work permits.

The tech sector, a key source of growth and defense innovation, now faces investor uncertainty. Intel, for example, canceled a $25 billion project, while other firms are considering relocating to safer havens. Tourism – a smaller but not insignificant contributor to GDP – has all but collapsed.

These trends raise longer-term questions over fiscal recovery, foreign investment and an industrial base that supports military procurement and political resilience. The longer Israel remains in a high-alert, multifront posture, the greater the risk to investor confidence, deficit containment and the economic flexibility needed to sustain prolonged military operations.

So far, Israel has been able to sustain this posture because the government, the military and the public were aligned in the response to the Oct. 7 attack. But now, in mid-2025, there are cracks in the wartime coalition. Public trust in leadership is eroding, particularly as the Netanyahu-led emergency coalition appears indecisive and internally strained. Protest movements have returned, and the controversy over ultra-Orthodox exemptions to military service has only accentuated resentment among secular sectors.

Institutionally, the government is showing signs of disunity. Coalition members disagree on war objectives, postwar governance plans for Gaza and how to handle Hezbollah and Iran. Judicial reforms for the supreme court, which led to nationwide protests in 2023, were never really resolved, and many in Israel are still uneasy about the prospect of limiting the court’s influence over the government. To be sure, none of this amounts to anything that would even approximate radical change, but it does suggest enough disagreement to create political paralysis – that is, a system too fragmented to adapt to the necessary changes of the war it’s fighting.

Geography is the cause of many of these changes and thus of Israel’s strategic dilemma. Israel is a small state, roughly 290 miles (460 kilometers) long and 85 miles wide, with adversaries on all sides but limited strategic depth. These disadvantages meant that Israel could not realistically sustain a protracted, multifront conflict, so Israeli military doctrine was built around short, high-intensity wars that favored overwhelming firepower and swift disengagement. But Israel’s response to Oct. 7has exposed the structural risks of protracted conflict.

To the north, a fragile ceasefire with Hezbollah in June has halted major attacks but remains unstable. Though rocket and drone fire has slowed, the threat of escalation keeps Israeli forces on high alert. Syria’s collapse has replaced a deterrable regime with an unpredictable Islamist authority. Though not openly hostile, the new regime’s control of Damascus and proximity to Israel constrain IDF freedom of action.

In Gaza, Hamas continues asymmetric attacks despite operational attrition. Without a viable postwar plan and under mounting diplomatic pressure, prolonged occupation remains strategically costly and politically corrosive.

In Iran, Israeli airstrikes earlier this year escalated the conflict. Sustaining pressure on Iran hurts Israel’s long-range capacity, while Houthi attacks from Yemen demand constant air defense and stretch IDF coverage into the Red Sea. The difficulty and vigilance needed to maintain pressure notwithstanding, the financial toll is considerable.

Each theater strains manpower, deterrence, legitimacy and strategic reach. Together, they constitute a burden Israel cannot bear indefinitely. U.S. aid helps, but growing political friction among the American public underscores the fragility of that support. Without it, Israel’s ability to project force and manage external criticism would sharply decline.

Israel isn’t without strategic options for achieving its objectives, but each carries a trade-off, and none offer iron-clad outcomes. The first option is a prolonged status quo: The campaign in Gaza remains active, the Hezbollah ceasefire holds tenuously, Houthi drones persist and post-Assad Syria remains fragmented. But because this stretches Israeli intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability and response capacity, it is probably unviable in the long term.

The second is retrenchment: reducing active operations in Gaza, reinforcing deterrence posture in the north and in Iran, and stabilizing the reserve system. While more sustainable, this would require clear political messaging and a phased demobilization strategy to avoid perceptions of defeat. Israel retains the military and logistical capacity to execute a phased drawdown, but the government may not have the ability, let alone the political capital, to communicate such a shift without triggering backlash.

The third path is escalation. This would be triggered by a break in the ceasefire with Hezbollah or a direct Iranian provocation. It would demand a full mobilization and an expansion of the conflict throughout, and it would likely surpass Israel’s capacity to sustain a three-front war. And there’s no guarantee Hezbollah or Iran want to escalate; so far, both have avoided direct confrontation, deterred as they are by Israeli retaliatory capacity. Still, miscalculation, internal pressures or continued Israeli strikes on strategic assets could shift the calculus.

A diplomatic off-ramp is an option that presents the most stability, but it is also the most elusive option. Though the U.S. still has leverage over Israel, meaningful deescalation would require Israeli political alignment, external pressure and a realistic alternative to military objectives – none of which is currently in place.

Of the four imperfect paths, the most likely under current constraints is a tense status quo: low-intensity conflict, gradual force exhaustion and mounting internal strain. Meanwhile, Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas will continue calibrated pressure to maintain operations without triggering overwhelming Israeli retaliation. Their strategic patience stretches Israel’s capacity on multiple fronts, doing nothing to address attrition and offering no decisive military objective.

For Israel, the past two years have revealed the limits of a system designed for short wars. Manpower is exhausted, economic pressure is mounting and political cohesion is eroding. At the strategic level, the gap between military objectives and capacity is only growing. Without clearly defined end goals, deterrence risks decay, and operations persist without closure.

Pray.

Train.

Stay informed.

Build resilient communities.

-END REPORT-