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Title: October 10, 2025

MIDDLE EAST SITREP

• Hamas-Israel Ceasefire: Hamas and Israel agreed on October 8 to the first phase of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. The Hamas-Israel ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a framework ceasefire agreement and not a comprehensive agreement to end the war. Hamas and Israeli officials have not yet discussed key outstanding aspects of the US plan, including governance over the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ disarmament. It remains unclear if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire will impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel.

U.S. TROOPS DEPLOY TO ISRAEL

The United States is sending about 200 troops to Israel to help support and monitor the ceasefire deal in Gaza as part of a team that includes partner nations, nongovernmental organizations and private-sector players, U.S. officials said Thursday.

The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss details that were not authorized for release, said U.S. Central Command is going to establish a “civil-military coordination center” in Israel that will help facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid as well as logistical and security assistance into the territory wracked by two years of war.

The remarks provide some of the first details on how the ceasefire deal would be monitored and that the U.S. military would have a role in that effort. After Israel and Hamas agreed to the first phase of a Trump administration plan to halt the fighting a litany of questions remain on next steps including Hamas disarmament, a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and a future government in the territory.

One of the officials said the new team will help monitor implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the transition to a civilian government in Gaza.

RUSSO-UKRAINE WAR

Heavy toll. Russian airstrikes have reduced Ukraine’s domestic natural gas production by more than half, Bloomberg reported. As a result, Kyiv will likely have to spend 1.9 billion euros ($2.2 billion) on fuel imports to get through the winter, according to the story. Strikes in the Kharkiv and Poltava regions on Oct. 3 destroyed about 60 percent of the country’s gas production. Following the attacks, Ukraine asked G7 countries to provide equipment to repair its power grid, as well as air defense systems to protect its energy infrastructure.

NORTH KOREA

Celebrations in Pyongyang. The deputy secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, arrived in Pyongyang for celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Medvedev, who is also head of the governing United Russia party, will attend a series of meetings with representatives of the Workers’ Party aimed at strengthening cooperation and expanding humanitarian and economic ties between the two countries. Chinese Premier Li Qiang is also in Pyongyang for the festivities, which will include a large military parade and war games.

CHINA & RARE EARTHS

Guarantee? China has demanded assurances from India that any Chinese heavy rare earth magnets purchased by New Delhi will be used solely for domestic purposes and not reexported to the United States. Earlier this year, China, which controls about 90 percent of the world’s heavy rare earth magnet production, imposed export controls on related products following the Trump administration’s announcement of tariffs against Beijing. Since then, a shortage of heavy rare earths in India has hampered the country’s electric vehicle and high-tech manufacturing sectors.

RUSSIA WITHDRAWS FROM ANOTHER NUKE AGREEMENT

Growing gap. Russia’s State Duma voted to formally withdraw from a 2000 agreement with the United States on the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium. In a speech before the Duma, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said the move was motivated by a “fundamental change in circumstances,” including U.S. support for Ukraine and sanctions against Moscow. Relatedly, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said dialogue between Russia and the United States on Ukraine has stalled.

RUSSIA & IRAN

Nuclear cooperation. A delegation from Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company Rosatom met in Tehran with the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Mohammad Eslami. Last week, Eslami visited Moscow, where the two countries signed a $25 billion agreement to build multiple nuclear power units in Iran. It was agreed in Tehran that Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev will visit Iran soon to review progress on construction of the second and third units of the Bushehr nuclear plant.

THE U.S., QATAR & VENEZUELA

Intermediary. Qatar is trying to mediate between the U.S. and Venezuela, The New York Times reported, amid mounting tensions between the two countries in recent months. According to sources who spoke with the paper, Venezuelan authorities support the effort, but the United States is increasingly disinterested in a diplomatic resolution.

GZB INFOCUS: CHINA’S ENERGY POWER PLAY IN THE GRAY ZONE

As the world transitions from hydrocarbons to renewables, Washington and Beijing are pursuing diverging paths that will have important implications for global leadership and geoeconomic power in the 21st century. Under President Donald Trump, the United States has rolled back green energy policies, doubled down on fossil fuels and questioned the viability of green technology. China, meanwhile, has set its sights on eliminating its reliance on foreign oil and natural gas to become the first global electro-state. In this global reordering, Africa – home to 60 percent of the world’s best solar resources and chronic energy deficits – has become the proving ground for Beijing’s ambitions.

China’s focus on renewable energy is not driven by ideology but by economic interest and strategic competition. China has massively expanded its output of solar panels, batteries and wind turbines. Despite rapid domestic uptake, production outstrips demand at home, forcing Beijing to seek out new markets for export. By flooding global markets with cheap green hardware and pairing exports with financing, Beijing is turning the energy transition into a strategic export industry.

China’s Surge, Africa’s Deficit

Over the past year, China has expanded renewable manufacturing at unprecedented speed. In 2024 alone, it installed more than 300 gigawatts of new solar capacity, bringing its total to roughly 1,100 GW – more than any other country by a wide margin. Beijing’s industrial policy fused cheap capital, scale efficiencies and relentless cost compression. Solar module prices fell to between $0.07 and $0.09 per watt, well below any U.S. or European competitor – with or without subsidies. However, to maintain profitability and growth amid this spectacular production surge, China must continually find new buyers abroad.

Nowhere offers a more natural outlet than Africa. Roughly 600 million people across the continent (43 percent of the population) still lack reliable electricity. State utilities are often insolvent, electric grids are unreliable and diesel generators fill the gap at prohibitive costs, sometimes reaching prices of $0.70 per kilowatt-hour. By contrast, Chinese solar mini-grids in Nigeria during a pilot program have delivered power at $0.16/kWh, with upfront costs recovered within six months.

As a result of cheap solar panels and accessible battery storage, Chinese-backed green energy has taken off in Africa. From June 2024 to June 2025, African imports of Chinese solar panels rose by 60 percent, to 15 GW from 9.4 GW. South Africa, the continent’s most developed economy and a coal powerhouse, was the biggest buyer, importing 3.7 GW, but even without South Africa, the continent’s solar uptake nearly tripled. The steepest growth occurred in oil giants Nigeria and Algeria, whose imports grew fourfold (to 1.7 GW) and thirty-threefold (1.2 GW), respectively. Though this trade is highly profitable for Beijing, it also helps generate goodwill in a region where China had developed a reputation for exploitation, and it ties African electrification to Chinese supply chains.

China’s leadership has institutionalized this strategy through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), framing energy collaboration under a “green development” banner. The 2024 Beijing Action Plan and Declaration pledged expanded investment in African solar, wind, hydro, geothermal and green-hydrogen projects as well as low-carbon industrial zones. In practice, FOCAC functions as a policy and coordination device: It aligns ministries, policy banks and state-owned enterprises like PowerChina and China State Construction Engineering Corp. (CSCEC) behind priority pipelines, blending finance, engineering and diplomacy. As part of this process, Chinese lending to Africa has started growing again over the past two years after a steep drop beginning in 2016.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech at the U.N. General Assembly last month – promising deeper emission cuts and long-term investment in renewables – reinforced this image of China as a pragmatic climate partner for the Global South. Yet the initiative is also a sophisticated form of industrial relief. By channeling surplus production into developing markets, Beijing stabilizes its domestic sector while amplifying its geopolitical leverage.

Recent projects underscore the scale of China’s ambitions. PowerChina signed a $400 million agreement in September to build South Africa’s 342 MW De Aar Solar Power plant. In Algeria, PowerChina and CSCEC broke ground on two desert installations totaling 420 MW. And at the 2025 Ghana-China Climate Summit, Beijing pledged 30 clean energy projects across Africa. Last year, as much as 90 percent of the continent’s supply of new renewable energy projects came directly from Beijing – a signal that electrification has become the new centerpiece of China-Africa relations.

Economics of Dominance

China’s green energy dominance rests on scale and price. New solar and wind projects are now cheaper across their lifecycle than fossil fuel-powered stations. For Africa, the economics are transformative: Cheap panels and battery storage reduce dependence on imported fuel and unstable grids, while offering governments politically popular solutions to chronic shortages.

This cost advantage is self-reinforcing. Each expansion round drives learning effects and efficiency gains, pushing competitors further behind. American and European manufacturers – constrained by higher labor costs and fragmented industrial policy – have failed to match China’s pace. Beijing’s manufacturers, once reliant on subsidies, are now globally competitive on their own.

The International Energy Agency’s 2025 projections show photovoltaic power dominating new capacity additions through 2035, largely due to Chinese hardware.

But China’s strategy is not without friction. African grids remain weak, and transmission bottlenecks cap how much new generation can be absorbed. Currency shortages make dollar-denominated imports unprofitable, while state-run utilities often struggle to honor payment obligations. Political risk — debt distress, shifting tariff regimes or post-election contract renegotiations – adds uncertainty.

Beijing has adapted by favoring smaller, modular projects that fit Xi’s “small is beautiful” initiative. It offers barter-style packages – trading infrastructure or electrification for mining rights – to mitigate repayment risks. Grid upgrade loans and technical training further entrench dependence on Chinese technology and expertise. Yet the leverage is not absolute. Resource nationalism and competing corridors, such as the U.S.- and EU-backed Lobito Corridor, threaten to diversify mineral buyers and processors, complicating China’s hold over cobalt, manganese and graphite chains. For small-scale solar, however, China will continue to grow its market due to the rapid uptake and cost advantages.

The Wider Strategic Field

Other powers are trying to catch up. The Gulf states, noting the same structural decline in fossil fuel demand, are diversifying income streams and expanding aggressively into Africa’s renewables. The UAE’s Masdar is developing a 10 GW wind complex in Egypt; Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power is financing projects across the continent, such as a 300 MW solar plant in South Africa; and Qatar Energy is investing in battery minerals and photovoltaic ventures in East Africa. These moves link green infrastructure to critical mineral extraction, echoing Beijing’s model but without its scale or supply chain depth.

Russia’s entry, on the other hand, is mostly rhetorical. It has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with more than 20 African countries, yet only Egypt’s El Dabaa plant is under construction. The U.S. presence is similarly muted. After withdrawing many climate and financing commitments under the Trump administration, Washington lacks a competitive export or financing apparatus. Allies like Britain, Australia and the European Union remain committed to net-zero transitions but increasingly rely on Chinese inputs for affordability and supply security.

Meanwhile, China’s green industrial playbook extends beyond solar. In batteries and electric vehicles, it has used subsidies, forced technology transfers and massive state coordination to build dominance. So far in 2025, 22 percent of new trucks sold in China were electric, signaling a potential collapse in diesel demand, given that trucking accounts for half of global diesel consumption. Europe, by contrast, is suffering from dependency. Volkswagen suspended production at two EV plants in Germany in September amid low demand, while Spain had to employ 2,000 Chinese technicians to launch the new CATL-Stellantis battery facility in Zaragoza. A similar process is unfolding for wind turbines. These dependencies are likely to grow only more acute, especially when combined with America’s retreat from supporting green energy.

Conclusions

China’s green expansion is transforming both its economy and its international posture. By turning renewable manufacturing into a pillar of global trade, it has created an ecosystem where industrial capacity translates directly into geopolitical influence. Every new solar field or battery plant abroad helps sustain its factories at home, preserve employment and recycle capital into further technological leadership.

The strategy’s success lies in integration. Beijing offers not just hardware but also finance, engineering and delivery. It can underprice rivals, move faster and link energy cooperation to mineral access and infrastructure development. The approach blends commercial logic with state ambition, anchoring Chinese influence across the Global South under the guise of climate partnership.

For all the risks, the underlying trend is probably irreversible.

Global electrification is accelerating, fossil fuel dependence is declining, and China is embedded at every step of the green supply chain – from African lithium mines to polysilicon refining to final solar module exports. While other actors compete piecemeal, Beijing’s systemwide strategy gives it structural leverage over both energy and materials.

The implications stretch beyond economics. Control over clean energy inputs confers geopolitical weight comparable to oil in the last century. If the 20th century was defined by petro-states wielding hydrocarbon power, the 21st will be shaped by the rise of the electro-state. And for now, that state is unmistakably China.

Pray.

Train.

Stay informed.

Build resilient communities.

—END REPORT